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Family Law.  In re Sophia M., 204 A.3d 605 (R.I. 2019).  A finding 
of parental abuse and neglect of a minor must be supported by facts 
and evidence that create reasonable inferences by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On the night of December 4, 2015, Anna and Ernest placed 
their three-week old daughter, Sophia, in her bassinet without any 
signs of injury.1  Sophia awoke in the middle of the night, and 
according to Ernest’s testimony, Sophia’s lip struck his collarbone 
while he was tending to her, causing her to cry for approximately 
five minutes.2  The next morning, Anna noticed an injury to 
Sophia’s lip; Ernest told her that Sophia hit her lip on his collarbone 
while he was burping her during the night.3 
Later that day, while changing the infant, Anna noticed a 
“weird shaped” bruise on Sophia’s back, a “little red bruise” on her 
stomach, and bruising on her upper shoulder blades.4  Anna took 
photos of the bruises and sent them to her mother, who suggested 
Anna call Sophia’s pediatrician.5  Anna took her mother’s advice 
and called the pediatrician, who advised Anna to take Sophia to the 
hospital.6  Anna testified that Ernest was initially hesitant to take 
Sophia to the hospital and suggested they wait until Monday 
morning; however, after further discussion, both parents took 
Sophia to Hasbro Children’s Hospital (Hasbro).7 
1. In re Sophia M., 204 A.3d 605, 606 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id.  When Sophia woke in the middle of the night, Anna asked Ernest
to get up and feed Sophia and Anna returned to sleep until 7:30 A.M.  Id. 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.  At trial, Ernest testified that he was initially notified only about a
rash on Sophia’s stomach, not bruising.  Id.  He says Anna later showed him 
the mark on Sophia’s back, at which point Ernest told Anna to call the 
pediatrician and did not hesitate to take Sophia to the hospital.  Id. at 606–07. 
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Sophia was admitted to the hospital, and a day later, Dr. 
Christine Barron, M.D. (Dr. Barron), the on-call physician at 
Hasbro’s child protection center, conducted tests and a physical 
examination of Sophia.8  The tests yielded normal results, but the 
examination revealed that Sophia had “bruises of different colors” 
on various parts of her body.9  Dr. Barron was unable to determine 
the age of many of the bruises, but was able to categorize Sophia’s 
stomach bruise as “acute,” or showing within the last 12 to 24 
hours.10  Sophia’s injuries healed normally during the remainder of 
her hospital stay and she did not sustain any additional injuries 
while in the hospital.11 
Dr. Barron took separate statements from both parents.12 
Ernest initially told Dr. Barron that Sophia’s lip injury came as the 
result of Sophia “crack[ing]” her head on his collarbone but could 
not provide an explanation as to Sophia’s other injuries.13  Anna’s 
story only differed as to the time in which she noticed bruising on 
Sophia’s stomach and whether it was actually a bruise or a rash.14 
Dr. Barron told both parents that their stories were inconsistent 
with the amount of force necessary to inflict these injuries, and 
three days later, Ernest changed his story and explained that 
Sophia’s injuries occurred when Ernest was leaning over to grab 
Sophia’s bottle out of the warmer.15  Dr. Barron claimed this story 
was “more probable” because it implied more force; however, Dr. 
Barron was concerned that Ernest changed his story only after 
being confronted.16 
Lastly, in accordance with standard protocol, Dr. Barron 
reviewed the medical history for Ernest’s other daughter, L.M., who 
8. Id. at 607.
9. Id.  Dr. Barron determined Sophie had petechia, “a small purplish spot 
on the body surface . . . caused by a minute hemorrhage.”  Id. at 607 n.4. 
10. Id.  Dr. Barron noted one particular bruise, on Sophia’s right flank,
that emerged after she moved from the emergency department to the hospital. 
Id. at 607.  Dr. Barron testified that this injury did not occur during Sophia’s 
time at the hospital and that it was not uncommon for bruises to demonstrate 
themselves several hours or even a day later.  Id. 
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 608.
16. Id.
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was three-years old.17  L.M. was brought to the hospital with 
unexplained bruising shortly after she was born and the mother 
was instructed “not to allow the father to be the sole caregiver.”18 
While the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) 
was never contacted in relation to L.M.’s injuries, Dr. Barron 
concluded that L.M.’s “injuries would be consistent with child 
physical abuse.”19  Dr. Barron noted significant similarities 
between the injuries sustained by both girls but also emphasized 
that she did not base her decision in Sophia’s case on the 
information within L.M.’s records.20 
Dr. Barron concluded that Sophia’s injuries were the result of 
“blunt force trauma” consistent with child physical abuse.21  Dr. 
Barron reported her findings to DCYF, who filed an abuse-and-
neglect petition against Anna and Ernest on December 8, 2015.22 
Immediately upon her release from the hospital, Sophia was placed 
in the care of her paternal aunt.23  After eleven days of testimony, 
the Family Court trial justice found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Ernest and Anna physically abused Sophia.24  The 
trial justice concluded in her ruling dated July 10, 2017, that based 
on Dr. Barron’s testimony, Sophia’s injuries were “sustained over a 
period of time.”25  Sophia was then placed in DCYF custody and 
Anna filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 2017.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) reviewed 
whether there was “legally competent evidence” to support the trial 
17. Id. at 607.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 607–08.
21. Id. at 608.
22. Id.  The petition, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section
40-11-2(1), alleged (1) Anna and Ernest failed to provide Sophia a minimum
degree of care; (2) Sophia was “without proper parental care and supervision”;
and (3) Ernest and Anna inflicted, or allowed to be inflicted, physical injury
upon Sophia.  Id.; see id. at 608 n.6; see also 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(1).
23. Sophia M., 204 A.3d at 608.
24. Id. at 608–09.  The trial commenced on January 26, 2017 concluded on
May 8, 2017, after eleven days of testimony.  Id. at 608. 
25. Id. at 608–09.
26. Id. at 609.
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justice’s finding of abuse or neglect as to Anna.27  The Court 
ultimately held that under the clear and convincing standard, the 
evidence was insufficient to support the trial justice’s finding.28  In 
making their decision, the Court considered the trial justice’s 
conclusions related to the length of time over which Sophia 
sustained her injuries, the relevance and significance of L.M.’s 
injuries in relation to the present case, and the trial justice’s 
reliance on two prior Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions.29   
First, the Court found a lack of evidence to support the trial 
justice’s finding that Sophia’s injuries were sustained over a period 
of time.30  The Court reasoned that the trial justice erroneously 
misconstrued Dr. Barron’s testimony categorizing Sophia’s stomach 
bruise as “acute.”31  Dr. Barron’s testimony did not lend itself to the 
conclusion that Sophia’s injuries were the result of more than one 
instance of abuse, but rather merely explained that signs of 
bruising can vary in time and showed that Dr. Barron was unable 
to age the bruises on Sophia’s body.32  Secondly, the Court found 
that the evidence of L.M.’s injuries was irrelevant in the case 
against Anna and reasoned that even if Anna were aware of the 
incident involving L.M., the evidence did not suggest that L.M.’s 
injuries were the result of physical abuse.33  
Finally, the Court distinguished the present case from two 
Rhode Island Supreme Court cases that the trial justice relied on 
in her decision.34  The Court distinguished the injuries to the 
children in In re Frances and In re Chester J. as far more severe 
than those suffered by Sophia and noted the prolonged period of 
time over which both children suffered their injuries as compared 
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 610.
29. See id. at 610–12.
30. Id. at 610.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 610–12; see also In re Frances, 505 A.2d 1380, 1382 (R.I.
1986) (affirming a finding of abuse and termination of parental rights after an 
eleven-month-old child was found to be in a permanent vegetative state with 
injuries “in various stages of healing” and mother was unable to explain any of 
the child’s injuries); In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 773–74 (R.I. 2000) 
(affirming a decree terminating parental rights where a seven month old child 
suffered severe injuries that were in various stages of healing and the parents 
had no explanation). 
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to Sophia.35  Lastly, and most importantly, the Court concluded 
that the evidence did not suggest that Anna ignored or implicitly 
allowed such abuse to Sophia.36  The Court looked to testimony and 
evidence of Anna’s behavior in response to seeing Sophia’s injuries, 
such as taking photos of the injuries and showing her mother, 
calling Sophia’s pediatrician, reporting the injuries immediately, 
and confronting Ernest about taking Sophia to the emergency 
room.37  While the Court understood the trial justice’s disapproval 
of Anna’s lack of response towards her daughter’s “screaming” and 
lack of explanation for Sophia’s injuries, the Court held that the 
totality of the circumstances did not create a reasonable inference 
that Anna neglected or abused Sophia.38 
COMMENTARY 
In the last footnote of the case, the Court highlighted its 
“concern” over a lack of movement towards reunification between 
Anna and Sophia.39  At the time of the Court’s decision, Sophia had 
been in the custody of her paternal aunt for over three years.40  The 
facts are unclear as to whether Anna had contact with Sophia 
during this time; although irrelevant to its holding, this important 
policy argument should have been included in the Court’s analysis. 
The Court has held the best interests of the child encompass 
the right of a minor child to reasonable care and maintenance, 
freedom from abuse or neglect, and the right to be given an 
opportunity to spend the remainder of his or her childhood in a 
35. Sophia M., 204 A.3d at 611.
36. Id. at 612. The trial justice wrote the following in her decision:
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that there is no duty upon 
the state to discern which parent actually inflicted the abuse against 
the child.  Allowing a parent to ignore or stand by while such abuse 
and neglect occurs is tantamount to the parent inflicting the abuse 
themselves . . . .  The . . . Court has also held that termination of 
parental rights was justified where a parent claimed ignorance to the 
source of a child’s serious injuries.   
Id. at 610–11 (citation omitted). 
37. Id. at 612.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 612 n.10 (“The pendency of an appeal from a finding of abuse and 
neglect should not be the reason for delaying efforts to reunify the child with 
one or both parents, should that be in the best interest of the child.”). 
40. Id.
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family setting in which the child may grow and thrive.41  Until the 
State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a 
vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural 
relationship.42  Both Rhode Island statutes as well as prior Rhode 
Island Supreme Court rulings have established a responsibility for 
DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunify families that are 
separated due to petitions alleging neglect and abuse.43  While the 
facts do not provide information as to what actions DCYF took, if 
any, to reunify Sophia and Anna, the Court’s comments do suggest 
that the fault lies with DCYF.44 
Ultimately, the Court’s analysis, in the form of a single 
footnote, does not go far enough to acknowledge the detrimental, 
and potentially lasting, effects of DCYF’s petition against Anna and 
the trial court’s erroneous decision.  Their inadequate commentary 
raises the question as to whether this is a larger issue of DCYF 
failing to live up to its responsibility, or if this is simply a narrow 
issue specific to the present case.  If this is a larger issue, the Court 
would have been wise to put DCYF and other Family Court trial 
justices on notice about the potentially harmful effects of their 
actions.  Separating parents from their children ought to be the 
exception, not the rule.  Further, when a child is separated from his 
or her parents, reunification ought to be a priority for both DCYF 
and the courts.  The Court appropriately inferred that the initial 
outcome of this case was especially unjust because of the unknown 
future impact this decision will have on Sophia and her family.45 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, under the clear and 
convincing standard of proof, found that the trial justice’s findings 
were not supported by legally competent evidence and vacated the 
trial justice’s finding of abuse and neglect as to Anna. 
Erin Ferry 
41. In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 165 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted). 
42. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
43. See 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(3); see also In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d
200, 203 (R.I. 1989). 
44. See Sophia M., 204 A.3d at 612.
45. See id. n.10.
